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ABSTRACT 
 Despite increased attention to internal controls and risk assessment, traditional audit approaches do 
not seem to be highly effective in uncovering the majority of frauds. Less than 20 percent of all 
occupational frauds are uncovered by auditors. Forensic accounting has recognized the need for 
automated approaches to fraud analysis yet research has not examined the benefits of forensic 
continuous auditing as a method to detect and deter corporate fraud. The purpose of this paper is to 
show how such an approach is possible. A model is presented that supports the acceptance of forensic 
continuous auditing by auditors and management as an effective tool to support the audit function, 
meet management’s regulatory objectives, and to combat fraud. An approach to developing such a 
system is presented. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Over the past decade, businesses have faced increased regulatory oversight and reporting requirements 
combined with global competition and increased costs of raw materials and labor. As a result, 
management seeks an efficient but effective approach to governance which satisfies compliance 
requirements but also protects the organization from fraud at an affordable cost.  
With organizations routinely processing terabytes of information daily achieving important audit 
objectives has become a daunting task. Traditional audit approaches and sampling methods cannot be 
expected to uncover the majority of transactional errors or occupational fraud (Wells, 2011; Oringel 
and Aldhizer, 2009). Technology offers opportunities to detect and deter fraud more efficiently and 
effectively. Statement on Audit Standards No. 99 (SAS 99), Consideration of Fraud in a Financial 
Statement Audit, codifies many fraud detection procedures and encourages their use by auditors to 
detect client fraud risk and identify transactions to be tested (AICPA 2002, AU 316.52, AU 316.61; 
Lanza and Gilbert, 2007). Technological skills, however, often exceed the competency of auditors 
causing them to resort to less effective manual approaches. 
The regulation that has had the most profound impact on management and auditors in the past decade, 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX02), requires that CEOs and CFOs assess and attest to the 
effectiveness of the organization’s internal control structure. It also imposes increased penalties for 
financial statement fraud. Both SOX02 and SAS 99 encourage management and external auditors to 
employ technological approaches and embedded audit modules to audit financial transactions and 
internal controls (Roth and Espersen, 2003). SOX02 Section 409 accelerates the SEC filings for Form 
10-Q and annual report Form 10-K. The new rules will eventually require public companies to file 
annual reports within sixty days of their year-end and quarterly reports within thirty-five days of the 
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end of the quarter. The FTC’s red flag rules, effective December 31, 2010 for financial institutions and 
certain other firms under FTC jurisdiction including CPA firms, require companies to check for and 
report specific violations. These rules are expected to increase compliance costs. Automating the audit 
process will enhance the company’s ability to comply with these reporting requirements and lower 
overall governance costs. Although increased regulatory pressure mandates more attention to internal 
controls, these pressures could actually increase fraud opportunities by overwhelming management 
and auditors with reporting requirements. 
Despite increased attention to internal controls and risk assessment, traditional audit approaches lack 
effectiveness in uncovering occupational fraud. In its 2010 Report to the Nations, the ACFE noted that 
most of the frauds were uncovered by anonymous tips and less than 20 percent are uncovered by either 
internal or external auditors. This is partly because external auditors focus on the organization’s 
financial statements only once a year and most auditing concentrates on small sample sets of selected 
transactions over fixed periods of time. A more effective approach would be to audit all or a large part 
of the transactions continuously. 
Continuous auditing, which has been the focus of much research and has notable successful 
implementations (Alles and Vasarhelyi, 2008), still eludes many companies (Alles et al., 2008). The 
major barriers are technical – the lack of embedded audit modules (EAMs) and auditor’s lack of the 
requisite technical skills (Li et al., 2007). Once operable, however, continuous auditing systems 
require less technical expertise and offer auditors a wealth of information that can increase audit 
quality while reducing the overall workload.  
Forensic accountants have recognized the need for automated approaches to fraud analysis yet 
research has not examined the benefits of continuous auditing as a method to detect and deter 
corporate fraud. The purpose of this paper is to show how such an approach is possible. Contributions 
are twofold. First, cogent arguments are presented, in the form of five propositions that support the 
necessity for a system of forensic continuous auditing. Second, the paper presents an approach to 
forensic continuous auditing that is scalable and can be phased-in to accommodate the needs of 
management, auditing and information technology. 
2. DEVELOPING THE FORENSIC CONTINUOUS AUDIT MODEL 
2.1 Impact of Regulation 
Management concerns about fraud have been heightened in the post-SOX02 environment due to 
increased penalties for financial statement fraud and governance requirements for a costly internal 
control framework. Requirements for auditors have increased dramatically and are costly. Compliance 
with SOX02 Sec. 404, that requires management to evaluate and attest to the internal control structure 
within ninety days of the audit report date, cost Fortune 100 companies about $7.8 million in 2005 of 
which audit fees were $1.9 million (Nondorf et al. , 2011).  
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) Auditing Statement 2, An Audit of Internal 
Control over Financial Reporting Performed in Conjunction with an Audit of Financial Statements, 
states that it is management’s responsibility to design and implement a program of controls to prevent, 
detect and deter fraud. 
According to the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE), estimated fraud losses in the 
United States for 2008 were $994 billion. The highly publicized frauds of the past decade have led to 
increased emphasis on internal controls. Adoption of the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations 
(COSO) framework and Statement on Auditing Standard No. 78, Consideration of Internal Control in 
a Financial Statement Audit, place greater demands on external auditors. The more detailed 
information technology (IT) controls, such as those found in the Control Objectives for Information 
Technology (COBIT) framework, have made IT audits standard for larger companies. Lack of 
technical expertise to conduct such audits has caused many audit firms to seek out and depend upon 
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more expensive third-party support.   
In SAS 99, the AICPA basically mirrored the tenets of SOX02 and increased the auditor’s due 
diligence responsibility for recognition of fraud. It also recommended extended use of technology for 
substantive testing and audit of controls. Auditors recognize that traditional audit practices that rely 
heavily on sampling small sets of transactions on a limited basis are not sufficient for evaluating 
internal controls or for detecting and deterring fraud. Also, financial audits that are based primarily on 
substantive testing and neglect detailed analysis of transactions or auditing through the computer 
cannot provide high levels of assurance.     
2.2 Auditing for Fraud 
Traditional audit techniques are not sufficient and do not provide continuous assurance. Nor are they 
likely to uncover the most risky frauds – those perpetrated by managers who can override controls and 
alter ledger and journal entries. In order to audit through the computer, a process is necessary that 
allows for testing of a significant number of transactions on a real-time basis and throughout the year 
rather than brief discrete intervals. The process should focus on areas of high risk, areas of concern by 
key stakeholders, and risks that are significant – those that may be unlikely but where an adverse 
incident could threaten the life of the enterprise. Through control frameworks such as COSO and 
COBIT, companies monitor and assess activities to detect incidents of errors, misuse and fraud and 
respond in a timely manner.  
To determine the likelihood that financial statements contain material misstatements, auditors conduct 
tests of transactions and substantive tests. Tests of transactions determine whether erroneous or 
falsified data have been processed. Substantive tests examine balances such as accounts receivable and 
accounts payable, inventories, liabilities and depreciation to provide assurance that financial 
statements are free from material misstatements (Rezaee et. al, 2001). Normally, if tests of transactions 
do not reveal irregularities then less reliance is required on substantive testing. However, if tests of 
transactions reveal abnormalities then substantive testing must be expanded. In a continuous auditing 
environment, tests of transactions is an ongoing process and evidence is collected on a larger set of 
transactions and over a wider time-frame that with traditional methods. This lessens the need for 
substantive testing and reduces the role of the external auditors resulting in savings for the client firm. 
As a result of new regulatory requirements for compliance and emphasis on IT governance, auditors 
with forensic IT skills have been in increased demand (Hoffman, 2004). Because IT control 
deficiencies lead to accounting and financial reporting errors (Alaali, Grant, and Miller, 2008), it is 
important that auditors be able to identify IT problems that affect financial reporting, evaluate the 
extent and nature of the problems and be familiar with steps to correct these weaknesses (Grant et al., 
2008). The Forensic Continuous Audit Model is shown in Figure 1. The first requirement is 
continuous auditing.  
3. CONTINUOUS AUDITING 
3.1 Advantages of Continuous Auditing 
According to the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) and Canadian Institute 
of Chartered Accountants (CICA) “A continuous audit is a methodology that enables independent 
auditors to provide written assurance on a subject matter, for which an entity’s management is 
responsible, using a series of auditors’ reports issued virtually simultaneously with, or a short period 
of time after, the occurrence of events underlying the subject matter.” (AICPA/CICA Research Study 
on Continuous Auditing, 1999). 
 
 
ADFSL Conference on Digital Forensics, Security and Law, 2011 
 
96 
Figure 1: Forensic Continuous Audit Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Because auditors often lack technological skills, a large percentage of companies rely primarily upon 
manual methods to evaluate internal controls. Consequently, these companies cannot determine how 
effective their control processes are on a daily basis despite large investments in governance (KPMG, 
2010). In a 2009 survey by the Institute of Internal Auditors, only 32 percent of 305 companies 
reported that they performed continuous auditing. By providing for automatic analysis of transactions, 
continuous auditing would relieve the auditors of the burdensome strain and allow greater focus on the 
analysis of suspicious transactions. 
3.2 Impact on Auditors and Governance 
Continuous auditing offers several advantages for auditors. Because it tests more transactions over a 
wider time-frame, it provides more comprehensive and timely assurance. Also, it is scalable allowing 
the magnitude and timing of tests to be performed based upon the assessed risk of the targeted 
transactions. It can reduce the amount of substantive testing performed during financial audits and 
allow greater focus on more important investigative matters. It can reduce audit risk and increase 
management confidence in financial reports. It supports compliance reporting and reduces both errors 
and fraud. While continuous auditing assumes that all transactions are monitored in real-time, 
judicious application of the cost/benefit rule would schedule tests based upon the likelihood and 
severity of the risk. Performing the analytical procedures on a routine basis would lessen the work of 
the independent auditors and reduce their time on-site thus avoiding costly tests and unnecessary 
distractions during the workday. Continuous auditing can result in substantial savings by reducing the 
amount of external auditor fees (Hermanson et al., 2006). Thus, it reduces overall governance costs 
while reducing the opportunity for errors or fraud. 
Tests of transactions using analytical procedures plus confirmation of account balances and events are 
the most common work product of financial audits. Confirmations may be either positive or negative. 
The negative confirmation is expected to be responded to only if the balance is not accurate. Research 
shows, however, that negative confirmations may not signify correctness as recipients may ignore 
them or they may be lost by mishandling (Aldhizer and Cashell, 2006; Caster and Sriram, 1996). 
When limited to small sample sets, tests of transactions may not be representative and cannot be 
expected to detect a large percent of errors or fraudulent activities. Given the increased transaction 
processing for most firms and increased regulatory pressures, the traditional approaches appear 
inadequate and require increased substantive testing. 
KPMG’s 2008 publication, Continuous Auditing/Continuous Monitoring: Using Technology to Drive 
CONTINUOUS 
AUDITING 
EXCEPTION 
HANDLING 
FORENSIC 
EVALUATION  
REFINEMENT 
OF RULES 
DECREASED GOVERNANCE COSTS 
HEIGHTENED INTERNAL CONTROLS 
DECREASED RISK OF FRAUDULENT TRANSACTIONS 
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Value by Managing Risk and Improving Performance, comments that: “As business risks of all kinds 
continue to proliferate, management and internal audit departments are actively seeking new ways to 
quickly gain access to valuable information to manage risk and improve performance. Such efforts 
increasingly include continuous auditing and continuous monitoring of organizational processes, 
systems, and controls.” 
3.3 Forensic Continuous Auditing 
Forensic continuous auditing (FCA) differs in the respect that more focus is placed upon the 
evaluation of sophisticated audit rules and examination of trends and anomalies that may reflect 
underlying errors or fraudulent commissions. FCA places more emphasis on the analysis of sensitive 
data sets and less emphasis on transactions for which detection risk is low. It also provides for a 
greater range of analysis and emphasizes improvement of the audit rules over time.  
Regulatory standards encourage the use of computer assisted audit tools and techniques (CAATs) for 
accessing and analyzing data files and suggest that risk assessment reflect the client IT standards 
(AICPA 2001, 2006). Recent research, however, indicates that only a minority of firms use CAATs 
for substantive testing because of the high level of complexity (Janvrin et al., 2009). Continuous 
auditing can provide much of the substantive testing in a routine manner and allow auditors to 
concentrate on the forensic analysis of data. 
3.4 Developing an Approach to Continuous Forensic Auditing 
There are various approaches to continuous auditing. The embedded audit module (EAM) approach 
depends upon audit specific software that resides in the targeted application (Alles, 2002). It allows 
auditors to determine which transactions are to be tested and at what frequency. Results are collected 
and reported real-time. Enterprise resource planning (ERP) systems often contain EAM functionality 
(Groomer and Murthy, 1989).  Surveys show, however, that companies that use enterprise resource 
planning (ERP) systems often do not activate the EAM because of the significant resource 
requirements which can slow overall processing dramatically (Kuhn and Sutton, 2010; Debreceny et 
al., 2005).  
The technical nature of EAMs require that auditors acquire a higher levels of technical skills to 
implement these tools effectively and may hamper their adoption  (Debreceny et al., 2005). Some 
researchers state that auditors cannot effectively administer continuous auditing because of low 
technical proficiency and inability to communicate with IT personnel (Li et al., 2007). 
An alternative approach is the monitoring control layer (MCL) which uses an external software 
module linked to the target applications and databases (Vasarhelyi et al., 2004).  
Ghosting allows the EAM or MCL to be used outside the production version of the application and 
avoid system performance problems. System ghosting creates a copy of an entire system on separate 
hardware and eliminates any risk associated with processing live transactions.  
In the FCA Model, the second requirement is exception handling which applies the audit rules in order 
to uncover errors and suspicious transactions.  
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Table 1 presents the steps for developing a FCA system. 
Table 1: Developing a Forensic Continuous Audit System  
1. Examine internal controls for adequacy to mitigate risks. 
2. Determine which risks are most likely or could cause the most harm to the organization. These 
risks should be continuously audited. 
3. Examine each risk to determine the appropriate audit rules to be applied. 
4. Examine each risk to determine the appropriate number of transactions to be tested – this will vary 
depending upon perceived risk and management objectives.  
5. Examine each risk to determine the appropriate frequency of auditing – continuously, hourly, daily, 
weekly etc. 
6. Identify target applications and databases for the associated transactions and events. 
7. Establish a protocol for reviewing and handling the selected transactions. 
8. Build the link between the CAAT and the data file to automate the continuous audit cycle. Ghost 
the application to an audit server. 
9. Maintain an audit trail of the selected transactions and examine trends and anomalies. 
10. Refine the audit rules making modifications based on experience. 
11. Report results to management, the audit committee and external auditors.  
12. Set alarms for suspicious transactions or events that require immediate action. 
 
 
4. EXCEPTION HANDLING 
4.1 Handling of Selected Transactions 
Exception handling is critical to the efficacy of continuous auditing. By performing a large number of 
tests over a much higher percentage of transactions, continuous auditing expands the testing of details 
to a large percentage of the overall data and can reduce reliance upon analytical procedures (Alles et 
al., 2008). It will also result in a large number of selected transactions that have failed the audit tests. 
FCA takes the process one important step further: it adds analytical tools to examine the selected 
transactions for possible errors or acts of fraud. 
Transactions that trigger exceptions or alarms must be responded to in a timely manner by qualified 
individuals with forensic knowledge and skills. Exceptions could be handled by internal auditing. 
Hermanson et al. (2006) suggests that software be coded to categorize incidents (selected transactions 
or events) into three categories: errors, misuse, and fraud. By responding to errors immediately, the 
source department may be able to take corrective action that eliminates future errors. System misuse 
could lead to increased employee training and awareness. It could also indicate the need for adjusting 
policies.  
Selected transactions that require the most scrutiny and careful response are those that indicate the 
possibility of fraud. In this case, auditors must rely upon established protocols for response. In any 
event, managers should be alerted and action taken to prevent or isolate any further occurrence of the 
event. As Smith (2005) points out, as the time lag increases between the suspicion of fraud and the 
recovery of forensic data, evidence becomes less valuable. Larger companies may have an incidence 
response team. If so, they will probably require an analysis of the situation that could be performed by 
the internal auditors. Internal auditors should play an important role in fraud investigation. Using the 
FCA process, data sets can be examined to uncover and document fraudulent commissions. The FCA 
process may be the first line of defense in proactively identifying possible fraud.  
Auditors may also play an investigative role in the development and maintenance of forensic evidence. 
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This might require the auditor to perform read-only searches, preserve time-stamps, secure data and 
maintain a proper chain of custody (Smith, 2005).  
4.2 Audit Rules 
Regulators and the public expect auditors to uncover fraud. Research, however, does not support the 
ability of either external or internal auditors to uncover significant amounts of fraud (Albrecht et al., 
2001). Thus, auditors must be trained to seek out specific types of fraud when analyzing the selected 
transactions. Special attention should be given to revenue manipulation and income-increasing 
manipulation because these are the most frequently occurring items in financial statement fraud 
(Johnson and Ireland, 2007).  Transactions that fail the audit rules or highlight anomalies would be 
selected for forensic evaluation by internal auditors. For example, in Figure 2, the relationship 
between revenues and cost-of-goods sold is tracked over time. Revenues may be expected to vary but 
the relationship between revenues and cost-of-goods should exhibit a low variance and remain fairly 
smooth. In Figure 2, anomalies are readily apparent. These discrepancies require investigation and 
could reveal a fraudulent misstatement of revenues. 
 Figure 2:  Trending Revenues with Cost of Goods Sold 
PCT Change in Revenues and Cost of Goods Sold
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The third requirement of the FCA Model is forensic evaluation of the selected transactions to 
determine what actions should be taken. 
5. FORENSIC EVALUATION 
Selected transactions might also uncover control weaknesses. For example, monitoring of access rights 
might identify instances of employee attempting to access unauthorized files or incompatible sets of 
files. The event would allow supervisors to take immediate action and correct the problem and modify 
the control. 
Continuous auditing and monitoring can be expected to increase the likelihood that all fraud, including 
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financial statement fraud, is prevented or detected in a timely manner. A large percentage of 
transactions are investigated and some results are presented in a graphical format. Transactions that 
fail audit rules would be written to a selected transactions file. Forensic evaluation using extended 
analytical procedures applied to the selected transactions allows proper and timely scrutiny. The 
forensic evaluation should examine the relationships between financial data within a period and over 
periods to detect anomalies that require investigation.  
Financial statement fraud can have a devastating impact on a firm’s stock price causing shares to drop 
as much as 1,000 times the fraud amount (Albrecht et al., 2001). Financial statement fraud in the 
United States accounted for 68 percent of reported fraud losses in 2009 (ACFE, 2010).  
FCA systems could monitor 100 percent of an organization’s financial transactions and business 
activities in real-time. Automating the analysis and testing reduces the cost of SOX02 compliance and 
reduces the risk of loss beyond what could be expected of periodic testing of small transaction sets.  
5.1 Analytical Tools 
Although many firms have adopted ERP solutions and have access to embedded audit routines, there 
are valid arguments for examining a modified approach to FCA. Research has shown limited support 
for the use of embedded audit modules in ERP systems (Debreceny et. al, 2005). Firms may have 
multiple ERP systems and each would require auditors to master the internal EAM. EAMs that operate 
internally can cause significant reductions in performance. An alternative is to use generalized audit 
software and apply established audit rules to transaction files in order to uncover erroneous or 
fraudulent transactions.  
Audit Command Language (ACL) and Interactive Data Extraction and Analysis (IDEA) are well 
known audit software that can be used for developing CAATs. Both can be learned without extensive 
training and have a high level of vendor support. ACL, for example, offers the ability to conduct 
continuous auditing over several ERP systems and other applications. In addition to supporting a large 
number of analytical functions these CAATs are capable of extracting data from a large number of file 
formats. Using ACL analytics such as Benford Analysis, one investigative audit by Forensic Strategic 
Solutions uncovered more than $70 million of fraudulent expenditures (ACL, 2011). Events such as 
these could be detected routinely using established fraud audit criteria to test transactions and controls. 
Controls could allow selected transactions to be further inspected using other computer tools that 
support forensic analysis. For example, Benford analysis uses a z-statistic to measure the probability 
that a group of data falls outside the expected distribution. For certain data sets, transactions for which 
the first digit was outside a z-statistic of 2.0 could be triggered for further examination. The trigger 
points could be adjusted based upon experience. Correlation and time-series analysis can also be used 
to detect errors and fraud in the selected transactions (Nigrini, 2006). The final stage of the FCA 
Model is refinement of the rules.  
6. REFINEMENT OF RULES 
6.1 Designing Audit Rules 
Examples of possible audit tests are shown in Table 2. Such tests are commonly performed manually 
on smaller sets of transactions and at distinct time intervals. The audit rules can test for errors, fraud, 
and the strength and presence of internal controls while also performing some substantive tests. 
Results can be used to create compliance reports. Refining the rules will require the judgment of 
experienced internal auditors based upon the performance of the fraud audit model. Rules can be 
modified based upon perceived risks and management objectives. 
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Table 2:  Examples of Fraud Audit Tests 
 
Fraud Objective 
 
Fraud Flag 
 
Fraud Audit Tests 
Fraudulent vendors Vendor address P.O box, Vendor 
address matches employee address, 
Multiple vendor addresses 
Check validity of vendor numbers, 
Check for P.O. boxes as addresses, 
Match vendor addresses to employee 
addresses, Flag large changes in vendor 
activity, Extract vendors having no tax ID 
no. 
Ghost employees Employees with same address Check employee addresses for matches, 
Invalid Social Security numbers, 
Compare number of employees over 
years to insure changes match new 
minus terminated employees, Flag 
employees who have not used benefits  
Unauthorized file access Employees accessing unauthorized 
files or incompatible files 
Compare log-ins to access rights and 
privileges 
Inventory loss Inventory adjustments Flag all adjustments exceeding a set 
percentage, Check deliveries outside of 
regular hours, Check employee access 
to restricted areas during irregular hours 
Vendor kickbacks to 
managers who order at high 
levels 
Inventory levels exceed established 
peaks, Average inventories too high 
Examine average inventory levels and 
high volume purchases, Establish an 
economic order quantity and require a 
signed override by inventory manager 
for larger amounts 
Copying sensitive data files 
(intellectual property or 
personally identifiable 
information) 
Employees accessing unauthorized 
files, Copy attempts on protected files 
Compare copy attempts to rights and 
privileges 
Financial statement fraud Senior management making 
fraudulent entries 
Flag all journal and ledger entries by 
executive management, Flag all entries 
that boost revenues over a certain 
percentage, Flag significant transactions 
with related party, Review sales 
recorded by Corporate Headquarters 
Invalid earnings  Adjustments to estimates such as bad 
debt allowance, amortization of 
intangibles, insurance claims, etc. 
Flag changes that exceed a set percent 
or ones made by executive management 
(should be made by lower level 
accountants) 
Cash larceny High differences between sales and 
cash receipts, High refunds, voids, 
A/R write-offs 
Summarize information by employee 
and flag all large differences 
 
Audit rules drive the analysis of transactions and events. These analytical criteria are created to flag 
transactions that violate policy or could indicate a fraudulent act. If the criteria are too stringent a large 
number of alarms (called alarm flooding) will be produced. To prevent the enormous number of false 
positives audit rules must be properly calibrated (Kuhn and Sutton, 2010; Alles et al., 2008).  
 If too loosely set the tests could fail to detect a large percentage of erroneous and fraudulent 
transactions. A major benefit of such a process is that the audit rules can be expanded and periodically 
evaluated for efficacy and adjusted based upon performance. Over time, experience-based adjustment 
of the audit rules can make them more efficient and effective. Fraud audit tests should be designed 
around objectives.  
6.2 Forensic Analysis of Selected Transactions 
Selected transactions can provide information to proactively detect impending frauds. By examining 
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trends in certain data series, anomalies can be inspected for possible defalcations. Chen and Sennetti 
(2005) demonstrated seventeen financial and non-financial variables useful in predicting fraud. Most 
important were, relative to sales, lower research and development costs, lower marketing costs, and 
lower changes in free cash flows.  
Special attention should be paid to financial statement fraud which is the most costly and often 
requires an override of internal controls. Financial statement fraud and earnings mismanagement can 
be detected through the judicious application of a set of quantitative and qualitative red flags (Grove 
and Cook, 2004). An overstatement of revenues would be a possible indicator (Johnson and Ireland, 
2007). Two examples of quantitative red flags would be irrational ratio analysis of Gross Margin 
Index and Sales Growth Index in order to determine if they fell outside of the industry norm. 
Horizontal analysis of the ratios could also point out trends and anomalies. Two examples of 
qualitative red flags would be significant insider sell-off of shares and opaque financial reporting and 
disclosures designed to confuse and mislead investors (Grove and Cook, 2004). 
Figures 3 and 4 illustrate the possible application of forensic analysis. In Figure 3, Benford Analysis is 
used to analyze employee expenses. If the distribution of first-digits follows Benford’s Law, then the 
resulting z-statistic would be low. The auditor might have a rule such as: do not investigate unless a 
digit has a z-statistic greater than 2. Such a rule can easily be altered over time.  
 Figure 3:  Applying Benford Analysis to Employee Expenses 
Employee Expenses March 2010
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 Figure 4:  History of Transactions with Error Rate and Outliers 
Transaction Activity
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In Figure 4, the number of transactions is compared to the percentage of known errors and outliers (for 
example, values that exceed the average by greater than 3 standard errors). Again, anomalies become 
quickly apparent allowing the auditor to focus the investigation on areas that are most likely to 
indicate a problem. 
7. PROPOSITIONS 
The following five propositions support the use of the FCA model as an effective method for deterring 
and detecting corporate fraud. They are rooted in practical realities that are likely to persist and place 
undue burdens on management, auditors and key stakeholders unless a technological solution is 
adopted. 
 With continuous auditing, auditors can design audit rules that test a large set of transactions (perhaps 
100%) at determined time intervals. With FCA, the rules can test for errors, fraud, and the strength and 
presence of internal controls, while also performing some substantive tests. Results can be used to 
create compliance reports. Over time, experience-based adjustment of the audit rules can make them 
more efficient and effective. Anomalies and outliers can quickly indicate the presence of potential 
problems. Thus, 
Proposition 1:  Forensic continuous auditing will add efficiencies to the financial audit 
process. 
Section 404 of SOX02 has elevated the need for extensive tests of IT internal controls that may require 
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the expensive services of a third-party firm. Thus, the need for more comprehensive yet cost-effective 
approaches is recognized by external auditors. By allowing the client to perform extensive testing of 
controls through continuous auditing procedures, the external auditor can avoid expanding the time-
consuming and expensive substantive testing. Regulations require that certain substantive tests be 
performed. Auditing Standard AU 319.80, 81 states that “regardless of the assessed level of control 
risk, the auditor should perform substantive tests for significant account balances and transaction 
classes.’’ By having access to increased data sets and allowing the client’s internal auditors to perform 
more of the transaction testing through continuous auditing, the external auditor will be able to focus 
on more important activities that are more likely to lower risk. Thus, 
Proposition 2:  External auditors will perceive forensic continuous auditing positively. 
PCAOB 5, An Audit of Internal Control over Financial Reporting that is Integrated with an Audit of 
Financial Statements, has increased the reliance that external auditors can place on evidence generated 
by internal audit departments in an effort to reduce duplication of efforts and lower audit costs. FCA 
combined with CAATs are capable of monitoring internal controls for SOX02 compliance reporting 
and uncover areas of higher audit risk. As external auditors rely more on the internal audit and client’s 
automated controls and governance testing mechanisms, less time will be required of external auditors 
or IT auditors. Additionally, fewer requests for ad hoc data sets will be made of the IT department. By 
having an established process in which audit rules can be increased and modified over time to improve 
the quality of the results, the internal auditors will play a higher role in the assurance process and be 
viewed more favorably by the audit committee and by management.  
Proposition 3:  Internal auditors will perceive forensic continuous auditing positively. 
Management can be expected to view a system that continuously audits for fraud positively because it 
supports compliance in a cost effective manner. As mentioned above, it will allow more work to be 
subsumed by the internal auditors thus decreasing costs and the time external auditors are on the 
premises. Furthermore, the external auditors can access and inspect data sets and reports remotely, 
avoid travel expenses, and not have to import data because the documentation and proof of compliance 
will already exist.  
Management might also take a human resources view towards forensic continuous auditing. SOX02 
has made acquiring IT auditors even more difficult and the number of qualified individuals is 
relatively small. The number of accountants with a Certified Information Systems Auditor license is 
less than 50,000 globally and all companies and accounting firms compete for these individuals (Kuhn 
and Sutton, 2010). Reducing the necessity for IT auditors will place less strain on human resources 
and commensurate salary levels.  
Finally, management will value the ability to phase-in FCA on an application-by-application basis and 
expand the number of audit tests over time. Thus, 
Proposition 4:  Management will perceive forensic continuous auditing positively. 
SOX02 requires management to evaluate and attest to the effectiveness of an internal control system 
(Arrens et al., 2006). Under increased regulatory scrutiny and facing increased audit costs 
management will seek cost-effective approaches to the detection of transaction errors and fraudulent 
activities. Increased penalties for fraud and the low percentage of fraud that is uncovered by auditors 
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will make continuous auditing attractive as a forensic tool. Fraud deterrence is recognized as an 
important management objective. To prevent fraud, it is imperative that internal controls be tested 
continuously and that audit rules are established to uncover fraudulent events. This can be 
accomplished by examining a large percentage of the transactions and system events.  
SAS 56, Analytical Procedures, requires that auditors perform analytical procedures during the 
planning and final reporting stages of the audit (AICPA, 1988). Analytical reviews, however, may not 
be effective at detecting frauds. Even large embezzlements may not have a material effect on the 
earnings of a large corporation and may escape discovery during a regularly scheduled audit (Wells, 
2011).  FCA, however, provides the ability for auditors to perform a multitude of analytical procedures 
over all transactions and significantly increases the possibility that errors and suspicious transactions 
are flagged (Rezaee et al., 2002).  Properly constructed systems could perform hundreds of different 
analytical tests on a large number of transactions daily. Each test would be intended to seek out red 
flags. For example, delivery dates could be examined for times when deliveries are not normally made 
(holidays, weekends, after hours, etc.) and selected transactions would then be reviewed.  
FCA also allows for special alarms called “audit hooks.” These are audit rules that snare transactions 
of a suspicious nature and allow for real-time intervention. A common example is when someone 
travels abroad and uses a credit card outside the normal venue. An audit hook captures the first use of 
the card in the foreign venue and immediately alerts a representative who then decides how to handle 
the transaction. One response is to attempt to contact the cardholder by phone or email. The response 
can take less than one minute. The hooks are highly effective at detecting and deterring possible 
fraudulent activities (Romney and Steinbart, 2008). Thus, 
Proposition 5:  Management will positively perceive the forensic continuous auditing model 
as an effective and efficient forensic tool. 
8. THE FORENSIC CONTINUOUS AUDIT SYSTEM 
The FCA system is shown in Figure 5. Note that the Forensic Audit Application module functions as 
an embedded audit module but is outside the actual production version and can be applied to different 
applications eliminating the necessity of building separate embedded audit modules. 
The Forensic Audit Application works with a cloned copy of the actual application using actual 
transactions but does not alter actual accounts or affect the performance of the system. Sensitive audit 
tests can trigger alarms that request immediate response. Otherwise, selected transactions are saved 
and reports created for scheduled reviews. A phased approach would be based on creating a tested 
system that could be copied for other applications. Because invoking the tests within the production 
version of the application could reduce performance significantly, performing the tests in the 
background is preferred.  
Some analysis of selected transactions may indicate the need for deeper inquiry. Extended analysis 
could be performed using a CAAT such as ACL or IDEA.  
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Figure 5:  Forensic Continuous Auditing System 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9. CONCLUSIONS 
The role of audits is clearly important and can have a strong preventative effect on fraudulent 
behavior, but audits alone cannot be relied upon exclusively for fraud detection and, with the increase 
of transactions processed, may not be an effective mechanism for uncovering errors or misuse. 
Experience has shown that the traditional audit is not an effective mechanism for uncovering fraud. 
Auditors and managers are faced with increased pressure to tighten internal controls and reduce 
corporate risks. At the same time, information systems are becoming increasingly more complex and 
larger sets of transactions are being processed. Evidence exists that when faced with advanced 
technology auditors often resort to manual approaches that are less effective at detecting fraud or 
material misstatements. Although continuous auditing is an attractive solution, many companies have 
failed to embrace it because of implementation issues and lack of trained auditors. This paper presents 
cogent reasons for adopting a system of forensic continuous auditing. Based on five propositions, an 
approach is presented that is manageable and scalable and can be introduced in phases. By using the 
continuous auditing approach, managers can be assured of transaction integrity and auditors can be 
relieved of some of the burdens of repetitive testing of controls and balances, allowing auditors to 
focus on matters that are more likely to reduce risk.  
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